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Abstract 
The needs for changes towards an effective in-service inspection of reactor components are presented, and the main areas related 
to effectiveness are described. These are the inspection scope focusing on potential degradation mechanisms, the schedule 
considering degradation kinetics and the optimized NDE efficiency. Then those elements of the technical development in context 
of NDE are presented, which respond to the challenges triggered by the changes, i.e. development in structural integrity analysis, 
fracture mechanics, life management and consideration of risk. Almost all responses can be connected to the development of 
information technology and microelectronics; these contribute to the improvement in flaw detection, characterization and sizing.  
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1. Introduction 
 Current and future use of civil nuclear power plants (NPPs) is fundamentally depends on their safe 
operation. This is especially true in the light of the severe accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, Japan. The 
technical basis for NPP safety is the defense in depth concept since it underlines the safety technology of nuclear 
power. Performance monitoring of systems, structures and components (SSCs), and relevant requirements and 
criteria for decisions that are made during plant operation are substantial part of defense in depth since the integrity 
of SSCs is essential for both plant safety and availability. The objective of this paper is, after briefly introducing 
maintenance, surveillance, inspection and testing’ as an integrated and coherent system of performance monitoring 
that contribute to ensure functional and structural integrity of SSCs, to present the major features of an effective in-
service inspection system. Finally, the major trends of the evolutionary process in the field of non-destructive 
evaluation (NDE) responding to the challenges triggered by the changes in various engineering areas are provided.  
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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2. Structural and Functional Integrity 
 SSCs that have a bearing on safety must remain in accordance with the assumptions and intent of the 
design over the whole operation period of the NPP. The major safety functions in a plant are: maintaining the core 
cooling, controlling the power level and confining the radioactive materials. Depending on the way of fulfilling the 
safety function, SSCs may be divided into active and passive elements. Structures are the passive elements; typically 
they are buildings, pressure vessels, pipelines and shielding. Their function can be: retaining medium pressure, 
resisting other loading and environmental effects, ensuring proper volume and cross section to contain medium and 
to allow it to flow. The passive elements accomplish these functions exclusively without moving components. 
Accomplishing passive safety functions means to ensure structural integrity of a structure or component. 
 A system comprises several components, assembled in such a way as to perform a specific (active) 
function. These components called active components, which accomplish their technological function with moving 
parts or changing material properties. Active functions can be opening or closing valves, pumping medium, moving 
control rods. An active component may have passive elements as well, e.g. in the case of a pump the pressure 
retaining housing is its passive element, though the pump as a whole is an active component. Accomplishing active 
safety function means to ensure functional integrity of a system or component.  
3. Integrated System of Maintenance, Surveillance, Inspection and Testing 
 Maintenance, surveillance, in-service inspection (ISI) and testing are the major strategies (activities) to 
ensure functional and structural integrity of SSCs. NPP maintenance is an organized activity covering all preventive 
and remedial measures, both administrative and technical, to detect and mitigate degradation of functioning SSC, 
and/or to restore to an acceptable level the performance of designed (active) functions of a failed component. 
Maintenance is the tool to ensure functional integrity of SSCs.  
 The objectives of the plant surveillance program are to maintain and improve SSC availability, to confirm 
compliance with operational limits and conditions, and to detect and correct any abnormal condition before it can 
give rise to significant safety consequences. The abnormal conditions which are of relevance to the surveillance 
program include not only deficiencies in SSCs but also trends within the accepted limits, an analysis of which may 
indicate that the NPP is deviating from the design intent. Surveillance deals with both active and passive SSCs, and 
basically contributes to ensure functional integrity. The objective of the ISI is to determine whether the pressurized 
components and pipelines are acceptable for continued safe operation or whether remedial measures should be 
taken. NDE as the major area of ISI delivers essential input in terms of existence, size and other characteristics of 
flaws to assess the components’ structural integrity on the basis of fracture mechanics principles. ISI/NDE deals 
with passive components.  
 Testing is the assessment of the condition and/or operational readiness and/or capability of SSCs. To the 
extent practicable, SSCs are tested under the conditions in which they operate when performing their intended 
function. Testing is not an independent item within the system of ‘maintenance, surveillance, inspection and testing’ 
but an essential part of its each individual element. Accordingly, post-maintenance test, surveillance test and 
hydrostatic test can be defined. Testing is carried out on both active and passive SSCs, and it may contribute to both 
functional and structural integrity. Figure 1 illustrates this integrated and coherent system of ensuring functional and 
structural integrity and after all the safety of SSCs. 
4. Structural Integrity Assessment 
 As it was indicated before ISI is a substantial tool of structural integrity assessment. Structural integrity 
assessment of pressure boundaries means the evaluation of their resistance to strength and fracture. Since the energy 
requirement for ductile failure is far greater than that required for failure in the brittle mode, the basic tool of the 
structural integrity assessment is the fracture mechanics. Fracture mechanics allows calculating the limit condition 
of the material, complete with intrinsic flaw (crack) without unstable crack propagation. The assessment method can 
be deterministic or probabilistic; its scheme is shown in Fig. 2. 
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Fig.1. Integrated system of maintenance, surveillance, inspection and testing 
 It is clear from Fig. 2 that the awareness of loading and environmental conditions, material properties and 
size and position of the existing flaws is necessary for assessing the structural integrity. All of these parameters are 
subject to changes during plant operation due to ageing mechanisms, and consequently a continuous decrease in 
safety margin has to be taken into account. 
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Fig.2. Scheme of structural integrity assessment 
5. Brief History and Features of The ISI Requirements  
 The ISI requirements are usually summarized in codes or standards developed by engineering associations, 
and are based on consensus of all stakeholders such as component manufacturers, operators, inspectors, regulators, 
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insurance companies, researchers. Each code should be in line with the requirements of the country’s nuclear safety 
regulation, and their use may be mandatory according to the law or regulation. The widely used ISI codes, e.g. the 
US [1], the French [2], the German [3] or the Russian [4] show many similarities but also differences exist. In many 
NPP operating countries the Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (hereafter ASME code) [1]is 
applied for guiding the ISI. Section XI has had a substantial and verifiable influence on the nuclear codes of other 
countries.  
 In the 70s it was assumed that failures occur randomly, and they are only slightly influenced by service or 
design conditions. Also, only a portion of components examined fell into welds, the remaining portion into other 
areas like cladding, supports, bolts, casting surfaces. As it became clear that failures did not occur randomly the 
determination of areas to be examined moved towards the degradation specific areas. Currently, inspection is 
primarily concentrated on welded joints but some codes, e.g. [4] require also base metal inspections. NDE is also 
carried out on fatigue sensitive areas. In case if the reactor pressure vessel cladding is considered as part of structural 
integrity assessment, also the cladding is examined by eddy current (ET). Scheduling of ISI varies in the different 
codes. Whilst the German and Russian code determine 4 years for the inspection interval for class 1 components, the 
ASME and the French code have a 10-year interval. Some of the VVER operating countries either from the 
beginning (Finland) or from a certain stage of the operation (Czech Republic, Hungary) introduced an 8-year ISI 
interval instead of the 4-year one. 
 In the first years of ISI code usage the construction requirements were applied for the ISI and, only later, 
they were replaced with requirements appropriate for operating plants. From this time, the acceptance criteria were 
determined on the basis of fracture mechanics taking into account the detected flaw stability. The ISI acceptance 
criteria should be different in principle from that of used for component construction because their goal is to justify 
the component’s fitness for service whilst the latter ones are quality control criteria. This requirement is not fulfilled 
in the Russian code [4] because it applies the quality control criteria for the operating period, too. For VVER NPPs 
the European Commission’s sponsored guideline (VERLIFE) is a state-of-art document, and can be used as ISI code 
[5]. 
6. Major Features of An Effective ISI 
 The development of ISI requirements bears the marks of those changes, which characterize the changes 
taking place in approach of the regulatory bodies in recent decades. This was substantially influenced by the results 
of international research and round-robin programs and network activities like ASME NDE Task Group (1975), 
PISC I, II and III (1979–1992), EBIV (1992), ENIQ (1993). Formerly requirements using deterministic methods, 
and detailed standards composed the fundamentals for ISI. Now they have been substituted by optimized processes 
reflecting safety, reliability and risk in an integrated manner. The inspection philosophy placed the focus on 
performance based and risk informed approach instead of detailed regulation. As a result of these the fundaments of 
an ‘effective ISI’ have been laid down. 
 The present’s and future’s effective ISI characterizing by ISI programs based on capability demonstration 
and risk considerations, are constituted of the following major elements, which are in strong interrelation to each 
other, see Fig. 3:  
1. safety-conscious and realistic determination of the ISI scope (focusing on the potential degradation 
mechanisms),  
2. safety-conscious and realistic determination of the ISI schedule (considering degradation kinetics),  
3. improved/optimized NDE efficiency including its formal proof by qualification for the areas determined as ISI 
scope [6, 7].  
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Fig. 3.Conventional and up-to-date approach of ISI effectiveness 
 ISI effectiveness means that fundamental ISI parameters (scope and interval) and NDE system capability 
are in optimal balance between safety and cost. The ISI effectiveness has a strong correlation with both the 
structural integrity assessment and the ageing management of components examined. The latter one is justified by 
the extension of NPP operation beyond design life. As for the structural integrity there is a two-way relation: on one 
hand NDE delivers an essential input for integrity assessment (flaw size, orientation, position and other parameters), 
and on the other hand the model of structural integrity assessment establishes the requirements for NDE 
performance and reliability (worst case flaw to be detected, probability of detection and non-detection, accuracy of 
sizing and positioning). There is a clear correlation between the examination reliability and the intervals of 
subsequent inspections.  
6.1 Qualification of ISI/NDE Systems 
 
 The results of large scale international projects have demonstrated that ultrasonic testing (UT) on NPP 
components could be quite effective. However, use of standardized procedures has been proved to be inadequate for 
some flaw types and geometries[8]. This recognition has led both to the inspection validation concept introduced 
first in the UK and to performance demonstration initiative (PDI) in the USA. Based on the UK approach, the 
European Network for Inspection and Qualification (ENIQ) as a European wide inspection qualification framework 
came into existence [9]. The objective of both the ENIQ and PDI is to establish confidence by a systematic and 
independent assessment that the NDE procedure, equipment and personnel are capable of meeting the inspection 
requirements in real circumstances.  
 Although the two approaches (ENIQ and PDI) have the same objective, there are differences in the way of 
the objectives’ achievement. The PDI can be characterized as generic qualification because it is not specific to any 
particular plant or to any specific defect type*. The demonstration relies solely on experimental measurements on 
test pieces, and due to the limited number of defects the results can have no statistical significance. In Appendix 
VIII of the ASME code, there is no requirement to determine the flaw size which is significant for structural 
integrity. The defects cover a range of sizes and so very few are concentrated at the size of potentially greatest 
interest. There is no requirement to include the defects which are most difficult for the inspection to handle in the 
test piece (worst case defects) thus they could therefore give an optimistic view of inspection capability.  
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 The European approach of inspection qualification can be characterized as specific qualification. Here there 
is a requirement to state at the outset the objectives of the inspection. All key input parameters relating to the 
component, the flaws and the required performance must be stated. These provide basically the ‘design criteria’ for 
the inspection and also the basis of its qualification. The qualification is, therefore, specifically tailored to the 
particular inspection. Significant portion of the qualification is the technical justification which is a collection of all 
the information which provides evidence about the reliability of an NDE technique as applied to the specific 
component. It could include physical reasoning, feedback from field experience, relevant round robin trials, 
mathematical models, etc. Practical assessment may involve test pieces replicating the component in size and 
geometry. A further feature of the European methodology compared to PDI is the way that personnel qualification is 
separated from that of the equipment and procedure. A detailed analysis on inspection qualification approaches is 
reported in [10]. 
6.2. Risk-Informed ISI 
 The main goal of the risk-informed applications is to mitigate the risks as far as possible by focusing on the 
highest risks items, and to direct all of the studied elements into an acceptable risk profile. ISI is one of the areas in 
nuclear industry where risk-informed approach is present. The objectives of risk-informed ISI(RI-ISI) in nuclear 
industry are similar than the above-mentioned goals, i.e. to increase or at least to maintain the safety level of the 
NPP. It can be carried out by focusing the inspection efforts and resources on the safety-significant elements and by 
this means, the effectiveness of the inspection program can be improved. The home of RI-ISI is the USA, since it 
was firstly developed, implemented and applied there. At the end of 1998 WOG (Westinghouse Owners Group) 
method, while EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute) methodology was introduced one year later. Both methods 
are based on the ASME code. There are five major stipulations and requirements (key safety principles), which have 
to be fulfilled by all types of RI-ISI in accordance with U.S.NRC Regulatory Guide 1.174 [11], as it can be seen in 
Fig. 4. 
 More methods were developed for RI-ISI by different expert teams, in different countries including Europe 
[12]. If we analyze the applied RI-ISI procedures it is easy to recognize the similarities and differences between the 
practices. The main steps are basically the same, but the execution of them may be different. It has to be mentioned 
that a European framework document was prepared under the leadership of ENIQ to provide guidelines for utilities 
both for developing their RI-ISI approaches and for using or adapting already established approaches to the 
European environment taking into account utility specific characteristics and national regulatory requirements [13].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4. Requirements for RI-ISI methods [11] 
7. NDE Challenges  
   
 Assets of high value and of high risk are ageing, but there is a need for their further use. This may lead to 
the gradual degradation of the safety margins of their SSCs. If we look at the age of NPPs being in operation 
worldwide, it can be seen that 50% of the operating reactors exceeds 27 years, which approaches or sometimes 
reached design life, see Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5: Operational reactors of the world by age, 2012, December [14] 
 NPP life extension became a world tendency, the key condition of which is the insurance of components’ 
structural integrity until the end of extended lifetime. Here the eminent and gradually improving role of NDE is 
quite obvious. Our today’s knowledge and experience is suitable for detection, slowing down and mitigation of 
known ageing mechanisms (corrosion, fatigue, erosion), and NDE methods and techniques are selected and 
qualified on this basis. Consideration should however be taken that as plants age and their service life are extended 
unknown and not expected phenomena of ageing can occur, and we need to be prepared for these. 
 Certainly in association also with the nuclear accidents, the world’s understanding on and relation to safety 
has been changing. Risk accepted by the society is decreasing, and these force regulators, whose task is the 
independent verification of safety, to render safety regulations progressively more serious. This again puts NDE in 
the foreground. On the other hand regulators tend to take into consideration risk, which means that NDE efforts are 
focused on the higher risk areas, and components to be tested are prioritized in accordance with their risk. This 
could even mean the reduction of volume of NDE; however for the examination of high risk areas the conventional 
NDE procedures and equipment are not more satisfactory, which is a question of quality and not quantity. 
Consequently, RI-ISI brings new requirements against NDE. It has to note that NDE can have an impact only on the 
probability of failure occurrence; as for consequences it is irrelevant. 
 Although it refers to a bit earlier period but spread of fracture mechanics cannot be excluded when 
discussing technical challenges having an outstanding impact on NDE. For today fracture mechanics became a 
proven tool for design and structural integrity assessment in many industries including nuclear. In the design the 
damage tolerance concept, in the integrity assessment the fitness-for-service has been established. Appearance of 
fracture mechanics demanded the quantitative description of NDE capability. Summarizing the changes and 
tendencies in the past decades, the present time and in the forthcoming period, it seems clear that new requirements 
relating to NDE are rising. The tasks are the reliable detection and quantitative characterization of the impact of ௅ in 
some cases still unknown ௅ degradation mechanisms in ageing SSCs. For these an effective response is required. 
8. NDE Responses Offered By The Technical and Scientific Development 
 The fracture mechanics’ demand led to a research program initiated and sponsored by NASA in the 70s, as 
a result of which the first database and procedure for probability of detection (POD) was drawn up [15]. Today the 
POD concept is an inherent part of engineering design as well as risk and lifetime assessment including the nuclear 
components. Figure 6 shows one of the POD curves of NASA program, where a special simulation (bootstrapping) 
generated new data from the original information and thus also the confidence intervals of the curve as a function of 
flaw size could be drawn up [16]. 
 Extreme development happened in the field of information technology and microelectronics. 
 Today’s development architectures are able to integrate different technologies; dividing lines between 
software and hardware tools tend to grow indistinct due to the more and more ‘intelligent’ microelectronics 
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elements; effects of quantum physics are possible to measure due to development in thin film technology by 
embedded sensors (sensor-in-chip). As an example, Giant Magneto-Resistance (GMR) sensing is the latest in ET 
technology. These sensors are quantum mechanical devices based on ferromagnetic spin effects and they change 
their resistance by as much as 10 percent when a magnetic field is present or absent; it’s a huge effect. For ET a 
sensor array consisting of32 x16 elements has been developed, see Fig. 7, providing a significant improvement in 
the flaw image in a shorter time [17]. 
 
 
Fig. 6: POD curve as a function of flaw size (for flaw depth a=3mm: POD = 90%, 
confidence level = 95%) [16] 
 
 
Fig. 7: GMR array layout and system [17] 
 Numerical simulation plays a more and more important role in NDE in the nuclear industry. Recent 
integrated simulation platforms allow the use of complex geometry (CAD design) and inhomogeneous structural 
material, and have a direct link to NDE interface. Simulation cover UT including guided waves, ET and 
radiographic testing; it does not limit only on wave propagation but manages flaw/wave interaction. There are 
opportunities that are supplemented by novel solutions based on particular details of already known physical 
principles, e.g. nonlinear UT [18], dynamic thermography [19], terahertz technique[20]. Signal processing is 
broadening by various methods of artificial intelligence (neural networks, fuzzy logic) [21]. 
 
a90/95=3 mm 
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 Summarizing the opportunities provided by technical and scientific development, it is clear that these give 
the chance for quantitative flaw characterization meeting fracture mechanics needs, more over for assessment of 
component risk having flaw. Technical solutions are becoming more sensitive, the signal processing more rapid and 
comprehensive. Number of task-specific NDE solutions is increasing; some of them are the integration of more than 
one NDE methods. Simulations accelerate and make easier the examination procedure development and 
interpretation of results.  
9. Examples for state-of-the-art NDE solutions 
 The most obvious area of simulation is the flaw characterization and sizing. Simulation penetrates to and is 
useful in NDE qualification, too. Cost and time can dramatically be reduced if practical trials or part of them are 
simulated. A prominent field of simulation is the proof of new technologies and/or techniques, especially in the 
development of phased array (PA) UT techniques. It gives a chance for optimization of arrays and for computing the 
delay law in case of different flaw geometries and positions. Figure 8 shows the optimization of a flexible (smart) 
PA UT probe to detect radial fatigue crack in a nozzle radius. This difficulty here is that UT beam has to pass 
through the anisotropic and heterogeneous structure of the dissimilar metal weld. No doubt that simulation became 
the ‘virtual examination’ in NDE design, which enables the design of NDE friendly components as well. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8: Optimization of phased array UT probe [22] 
 
 Among NDE techniques many examples could be selected to illustrate the development. If we consider 
only UT then PA technique would be on the top. Mentioned should also be the time of flight diffraction (TOFD) 
method, the application of guided wave (GW) or long range UT (LRUT), and the expansion of electro-magnetic 
acoustic transducer (EMAT). A substantial step in the development is the appearance and spreading of digital 
(filmless) radiography. Due to volume limit of this paper these cannot be discussed here in details. 
10. Summary 
 Maintenance, surveillance, inspection and testing as elements of ensuring functional and structural integrity 
of SSCs at nuclear plants were briefly characterized. It was shown that these activities are not independent actions; 
each of them has its own role and importance in ensuring either functional or structural integrity of either an active 
or a passive SSC. Maintenance, surveillance and inspection are substantial elements of plant life management 
(service life extension). After analyzing both the role and importance of ISI in the context of defense in depth, and 
the relation of ISI to structural integrity assessment, the basic requirements for an effective ISI program were 
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presented. Inspection qualification and the use of risk as the major contributors to the effective ISI were briefly 
described. Since NDE is the substantial element of ISI, a short survey on recent NDE challenges and responses were 
performed. It is visible that due to the overall aging of the NPP fleet new requirements relating to NDE are rising. 
The opportunities provided by technical and scientific development give the chance for quantitative flaw 
characterization meeting fracture mechanics needs, more over for assessment of component risk having flaw. 
Technical solutions are becoming more sensitive, the signal processing more rapid and comprehensive, simulations 
accelerate and make easier the examination procedure development and interpretation of results. 
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